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Summary  findings
Survey-based estimnates  of average program participation  estimate the marginal odds of participating in schooling
conditional on income are often used in assessing the  and antipoverty programs. Their results suggest early
distributional impacts of public spending reforms.  capture of these programs by the nonpoor.
But program participation could well be  Thus, conventional methods of assessing benefit
nonhomogeneous,  so that marginal impacts of program  incidence underestimate the gains to India's rural poor
expansion or contraction  differ greatly from average  from higher public outlays, and their loss from program
impacts.  cuts.
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"Benefit incidence analysis" (BIA) is widely used to infer the distributional impacts of
public spending. The key data input to traditional BIA is a survey-based estimate of  how the
odds of participation in various public programs vary with the welfare indicator. Typically, the
average participation rates for a specific public program are tabulated against household income
or expenditure per person. A subsidy rate for each category of spending is then applied to the
participation numbers to infer the incidence of the gains from public spending and from
2 reallocations between categories of spending.
While BIA is a well established tool in understanding who benefits from public spending,
the method is known to have its limitations.3 One concern is that the subsidy per unit of usage
may be a poor indicator of "benefit"; unlike the commodities obtained on markets, utilization of
a publicly supplied good is unlikely, as a general rule, to reveal the value (specifically the
marginal rates of substitution with private goods) that consumers attach to that good.
Another concern is that average benefits (even when correctly measured) need not be a
reliable guide to the incidence of a change in aggregate  spending on a given program, or the
distributional impact of a reallocation of the budget between programs.  Consider first the case of
a pure public good i.e., a good for which one person's consumption does not deplete the amount
left for anyone else. For such a good, the quantity constraints on consumption entail that
marginal rates of substitution could vary greatly between consumers at the current level of public
2  Examples of this type of analysis include Meerman (1979), Selowsky (1979), Meesook (1984), Medel et al.,
(1992), van de Walle (1995), and Demery (1997).
For overviews of the conceptual and practical issues that arise in using this method to assess how much the
poor gain from public spending see Selden and Wasylenko (1992) and van de Walle (1998).
2provisioning.  A small reduction in supply could then have a very different value to different
consumers.  This will be less likely with a large change in supply of the public good for then the
infra-marginal losses of consumer surplus will dominate (Piggott and Whalley, 1987).
What about the (arguably) more common case of publicly-supplied private goods,
including transfers? These are typically also subject to quantity constraints.  However, unlike
public goods, there is a program allocation across consumers which also comes into play. The
current distributional impacts of a change in provisioning will depend on how well positioned
different socio-economic groups are to gain from marginal expansions, given the history of past
allocations under the public program.  Suppose that the non-poor were able to capture the bulk of
the gain when the program was first introduced, but are now virtually satiated at the margin.
Then the poor will gain a large share of the marginal benefits from program expansion even
though their share of average benefits is low.  Similarly, finding that the non-poor obtained a
high share of average benefits could be perfectly consistent with the poor bearing the bulk of the
cost of a contraction in aggregate outlays.4 We know surprisingly little about how much
difference this might make to the inferences which are routinely drawn about the incidence of
changes in public spending from standard incidence calculations. 5 The timing of program
capture by different income groups could well be critical to the policy conclusions drawn about
the incidence of gains and losses from public spending reforms.
For example, see the results of  Bidani and Ravallion (1996), who compare the impacts of cross-country
differences in public health spending on health indicators for the poor versus the non-poor, and find that
differences in public health spending matter far more to the health outcomes of the poor than the non-poor.
Piggott and Whalley (1987) use simulations to demonstrate that marginal versus average incidence for a public
good can differ substantially.  Studies which have tracked changes in incidence over time have also thrown
light on how the composition of beneficiaries changes over time; for further discussion see Lipton and
Ravallion (1995, section 6.4.3) and for examples see Hammer et al., (1995) and van de Walle (1995).
3We examine this issue empirically, using new data on participation in primary schooling
and the main anti-poverty programs in rural India, based on a large national survey for 1993-94.
We provide estimates of the average participation rates, following reasonably standard methods.
We then address the above concern about these methods by estimating marginal participation
rates, and we compare the average and marginal odds of participation. To estimate the marginal
odds of participation, we exploit the fact that there are large geographic differences across India
in the scale of each of thie  various types of public programs. By comparing average participation
rates of a given income stratum across areas with different levels of average participation we can
identify the scale effect on the socio-economic composition of participants.
The following section discusses in general terms the distinction between average and
marginal incidence, and why they might differ.  For this purpose we use a simple theoretical
model of the political-economy of targeting. The two sections which follow then describe our
methods and data respectively.  This is followed by a discussion of the results for both primary
education and the anti-poverty programs. Section 6 concludes.
2.  How does the composition of program participation vary with scale?
Let the population be divided into two or more groups according to income (or some
other criterion). For each income group we measure the participation rate in a public program,
and we examine the effect of expanding the overall size of the program.  If the group-specific
participation rates stay the same then we shall say that the composition of program participation
is homogeneous. 6 If 40% of participants are poor when 100 participants are covered then 40%
6  Strictly  we mean  "homogeneous  of degree  one".
4are also poor when 1000 are covered.  Policy conclusions drawn from standard benefit incidence
analyses implicitly assume homogeneity. However, there is no obvious reason why this would
hold.
Nonhomogeneous participation in public programs arises when the non-poor are able at
certain times to capture the benefits of these programs, even when ostensibly targeted solely to
the poor.  This assumes that the government is either unable to target perfectly - due to
information or incentive problems - or that doing so is not a political equilibrium, in that the
support of the non-poor is crucial. 7 The timing of such program capture will depend on how the
costs and benefits of participation vary with the scale of the program.  Social programs invariably
impose costs on participants, both in the form of direct cofinancing through taxes or fees, or
more hidden deadweight losses from participation, such as the opportunity cost to parents of
children's time at school, or costs to a non-poor person of securing participation in a means-
tested program by illegal means.  Such costs could well vary with the scale of the program.
For example, the geography of program placement can generate nonhomogeneous
participation. Consider a country where poor areas tend to be more remote, and hence less
convenient for program staff to reach.  So initial placement tends to be in less poor areas.  When
the program is first set up, participation by the poor is more costly than when the program
eventually expands into poor areas. Thus, there is early capture of the program by the more
accessible non-poor.  But after some point, marginal gains start to favor the poor through a
process of public-spending "trickle down".
For an overview of these issues see Besley and Kanbur (1993). For a model with the political economy of
targeting  in  which perfect  targeting  is not an equilibrium  see Gelbach  and Pritchett  (1997).
5General equilibrium effects could also produce rising costs of participation in a way
which differs between poor and non-poor. For example, while a small public works program may
well have no effect on wages in alternative work, a large one is more likely to bid up wages and
hence increase the expected foregone income of program participants. To the extent that the non-
poor face better chances of getting work they will find the public employment program less and
less attractive as it expands. Again, early capture by the non-poor can be expected.
These are all cases of early capture, but late capture is also possible. For example, it may
be far easier for the (theoretically ineligible) non-poor to bribe officials to gain access to the
program once it is more widely available and so a non-poor participant is less conspicuous.
We can formalize these arguments in a simple political-economy model of the capture of
an anti-poverty by the non-poor.  The model assumes that the government wants to reduce
poverty with the program, but that it faces a political-economy constraint which restricts any
adverse welfare impacts on the non-poor.  In particular, the program imposes costs on the non-
poor (such as taxes for financing the program) which depend on average participation (of the
poor and non-poor). The non-poor have political influence over program placement which they
use to obtain compensatory benefits.  Let the cost to the non-poor be C(X) where X is average
participation and C is a smoothly increasing function with C(O)=O. Marginal cost is C ' (X)
which could either increase or decrease with X (for C convex or concave respectively).  The
program is allocated between non-poor households, who each get Xn, and the poor, who get Xp.
The corresponding benefits are B(Xn) and B(Xp)  respectively, where the function B is increasing
6from B(O)=O. 8 Utility of a non-poor household is U[Y,,  + B(Xn)  - C(X)] where Y, is its
exogenous income and the function U is strictly increasing.
Assume now that political feasibility requires that the non-poor do not lose from the
program. i.e., a necessary condition for the program to continue is that:
U[Y,I + B(X,)  - C(X)]  2 U(Y,I)  (1)
where U(Y, 1 ) is the fall-back utility of the non-poor without the program (X,,=X=O). Since the
government values gains to the poor, the political-economy constraint will be binding in
equilibrium. (For if it were not binding, then there would be a politically feasible change which
benefited the poor.)  Since (1) must then hold with equality, we have:
B(X,,)  = C(X)  (2)
Solving (2) for,
1=  x  (X)  (3)
tells us how program participation by the non-poor varies with average participation consistently
with the political-economy constraint. The poor get the rest:
Xp = [X - Nn T (X)] Np- 1 (4)
where the Nn and Np are the proportions of the population who are non-poor and poor
respectively. The marginal increment to participation by the non-poor as the program expands -
the marginal participation rate of the non-poor - is given by:
T I (X) = C I (X) B I  (X,J1)  (5)
To simplify  the notation  we write  the B function  as common  between  the poor and non-poor.  Allowing  the
functions  to differ makes  no difference  to the following  analysis,  though  it could clearly  matter  to the
assessment  of benefit  incidence  in  practice.
7To see what this model implies for the timing of program capture, consider first the
special case in which B is linear (constant marginal benefit).  Then it is plain from (5) that X,
will be concave (convex) in X - implying that the marginal gains to the poor tend to rise (fall) as
the program expands - whenever the program entails a decreasing (increasing) marginal cost for
the non-poor.  Early (late) capture will be found when the cost function is concave (convex).
With declining marginal benefit to the non-poor (B concave), a convex cost function still
implies late capture.  However, for early capture, the cost function must be sufficiently concave.
On differentiating (5) w.r.t. X, it is readily verified that
p  y  (X) = [C" (X) B  (X,) - X,  I  (X) C I  (X) B " (X,)]B (Xn)j 2 (6)
The necessary and sufficient condition for early capture (T" (X) < 0) to be the only politically
feasible option in this model is that that the (absolute) elasticity of marginal cost
(-XC"(X)C  I (X)  ') exceeds the elasticity of participation by the non-poor (XT  '  (X)XJ')  times
the elasticity of the marginal benefit from the program's  allocation (-X,,B"(Xn)B I  (X,,) 1).
This simple model illustrates how, for public programs with relatively large start-up
costs, early capture by the non-poor could well be the only politically feasible option, particularly
when those start-up costs must be financed domestically.  For example, to be willing to pay taxes
to cover the program's  start up, the non-poor may well require a sizable share of the initial
benefits, such as by assuring that the program is not located in inaccessible, and poor, areas.
Only later, when marginal costs of program expansion are lower, will it be feasible politically to
reach the poor. (This model also suggests a case for external financing of the start-up costs of
anti-poverty programs, though this takes us beyond our present scope.)
8The early capture case is illustrated in Figure 1!-  This is drawn as if there are equal
numbers of "poor" and "non-poor".  On the vertical axis we have the group-specific participation
rate in the program (X,]  and Xp in the above model).  On the horizontal axis we have the average
participation rate over both groups (X).  The figure then gives the group-specific participation
rate as it varies with the average rate i.e., the functions T(X) and 2X-T(X)  for the non-poor and
poor respectively.  As drawn, the non-poor capture the bulk of the gains initially, but become
progressively satiated.  Imagine we are currently at point A, where participation rates of the poor
and non-poor are the same. From this information, the standard BIA would conclude that an
expansion in the program would not benefit the poor relative to the non-poor.  However, this is
plainly wrong; the bulk of the gains from an aggregate expansion of the program from point A
will go to the poor.
Late capture is illustrated in Figure 2.  Suppose we are initially at the average
participation rate B. The data on group-specific participation indicate that the poor are
participating more than the non-poor. Yet the bulk of the gains from increasing the level of
average participation to (say) point A are captured by the non-poor.
One expects that some public programs will be more like the early capture model in
Figure 1, and others will be more like Figure 2.  For example, it appears likely that better off
parents will be the first to see their children gaining from public spending on schooling, but that
they become satiated in due course, with marginal gains then going to the poor, as in Figure 1.
By contrast, consider a food rationing scheme which is initially targeted to the poor, but in time
political pressures to favor middle income groups lead to higher marginal gains to the non-poor;
Figure 2 represents this case.
9The above discussion suggests that the homogeneity assumptions routinely used in BIA
can be deceptive for inferring how the gains and losses from public spending reforms will be
distributed.  The outcomes in practice will depend on the specifics of the setting.  The rest of this
paper will provide some evidence for India.
3.  Measuring participation rates
Sampled households have been ranked by consumption expenditure (or income) per
person, adjusted for differences in the cost of living. The average participation rate is the
proportion of households in a given quintile (say) of consumption per person who participate in
the program. The average odds-ratio of participatio  is given by the ratio of the quintile-specific
average participation rate to the overall average. The marginal odds-ratio of participation (MOP)
is defined as the increment to the program participation rate of a given quintile associated with a
change in aggregate participation in that program. Differences between the marginal and average
odds of participation reflect differences in the incidence of infra-marginal spending, as discussed
in the last section. Only with homogeneous participation will the two be everywhere the same.
The average odds of participation can be calculated straightforwardly from the survey
data. How can we estimate the MOP?  We assume that only a single cross-sectional survey is
available (as typically used in BIA). 9 We have data on program participation across geographic
areas ("regions") within states (or it might be households within states if the micro data are
In some potential  applications  of this approach,  one might  have more  than one cross-sectional  survey available
which  asked about program  participation.  Then  one could form regional  panels,  allowing  changes  over  time  to
be studied. This  would  have the advantage  of sweeping  out any regional  fixed  effects,  though  inter-temporal
measurement  errors  may  entail a lower  "signal-to-noise"  ratio on the changes  over time  than the levels  at one
time.
10available).  We have calculated the average participation rates for a given program for each
quintile and each region. The participation rate for a given quintile varies across regions
according to the level of public spending on the program in the state to which each region
belongs, as well as other variables (discussed further below).
To estimate the MOP by program and expenditure quintile we can regress the quintile-
specific participation rates across regions on the average state participation rates (all quintiles, all
regions) for each program. 1 0 However, Ordinary Least Squares regression will give a biased
estimate of the MOP, since the region and quintile specific participation rate (on the left hand
side) is implicitly included when calculating the overall mean participation rate across all regions
and quintiles (on the right hand side).  To deal with this problem we use an Instrumental
Variables Estimator, in which the "leave-out mean" is used as the instrumental variable for the
state average participation rate; the leave-out mean is defined as the mean for the state excluding
the region and quintile specific participation rate corresponding to each observation in the data."
How can the MOP be interpreted?  As with the average participation rates, one must also
know the subsidy rates for the program to infer overall incidence.  In conventional BIA, the
subsidy rate for each program is typically assumed to be one number, constant over income
groups and geographically. (For example, it is assumed that it costs the same to the government's
budget to have a poor person participate as a rich person.)  Under the same assumption, the
10  Our precise  method  appears  to be new, although  models  of outcome  indicators  stratified  by socio-economic
group  are familiar  from past work. See,  for example,  Deolalikar  (1995)  which studies  the cross-sectional
differences  in health  outcomes  for poor  children  versus  others  in Indonesia.
So if one is using  the data for quintile  3 in region 5 within  state 10  then the leave-out  mean is the average  for
all regions and quintiles  within  that state excluding  quintile  3 in region  5.
11marginal odds of participation can be used to infer the incidence by quintiles of an increase in
public spending on a given program.  We will be able to make partial tests of that assumption.
4.  Data
Our analysis is based on India's National Sample Survey (NSS) for 1993-94. In addition
to more standard data on consumption expenditures, demographics and education attainments,
this round of the NSS also asked about participation in various anti-poverty programs at
household level.  Participation in three key programs is identified: public works schemes, a
means-tested credit scheme called the "Integrated Rural Development Programme" (IRDP), and
a food rationing scheme, the "Public Distribution System" (PDS). The data on participation in
these programs can be collated with data on total consumption expenditure per person at the
household level.  Participation in public works programs is based on whether any household
member worked for at least 60 days on public works during the preceding 365 days. Participation
in the IRDP program is defined as whether the household received any assistance during the last
5 years from IRDP.  Participation in the PDS program is defined as whether the household
purchased any commodity from a ration/fair price shop during the last 30 days.
Sampled households in the NSS are ranked by total consumption expenditure (including
imputed values of consumption from own production) per person normalized by state-specific
poverty lines. Quintiles are defined over the entire rural population, with equal numbers of
people in each.  So the poorest quintile refers to the poorest 20% of the national rural population
in terms of consumption per capita.
12There are a number of ways in which these data are less than ideal. The relationship
between IRDP participation over the last five years and consumption expenditure over the last
month may well be a poor indication of the program's  incidence, to the extent that participants'
living standards may have changed considerably over such a period.  There are also concerns
about the adequacy of "participation" as an indicator of utilization for PDS; for example, the rich
may only buy a small quantity of the rationed good (though this conjecture is not consistent with
other data on the incidence of PDS purchases; see Radhakrishna and Subbarao, 1997). And there
is the possibility that the individual participant may have a different standard of living to the
household as a whole; a poor person within a non-poor household may be attracted to a public
works project for example. In the case of public works, it is also likely that the question will
pick up participation in public works projects which are not anti-poverty programs as such.
The sample size (rural areas only) of the 1993-94 NSS was 61,464 households. The
analysis is done at the level of the NSS region, of which there are 62 in India, spanning 19 states
and with each NSS region belonging to only one state.  So in the basic model, for any given
combination of quintile and program, we regress the sample participation rates across the 62 NSS
regions on the average participation rate (irrespective of quintile) across each of the 19 states.
Recall that inferring the incidence of changes in public spending from the estimated MOP
requires the common assumption in BIA that the average subsidy rate (given participation) is a
constant.  For Public Works Programs and IRDP there is no obvious way in which the subsidy
rate conditional on participation would vary by household expenditure per person within a given
state.  However, variation between states can be expected. For the Public Distribution System
13income effects on demand for the rationed goods could well also create differences in the subsidy
rate across quintiles within a given state.
We were able to test the assumption of a constant subsidy rate for Public Works
Programs, IRDP and primary school enrollment.  However, the data to do so were not available
for the Public Distribution System.  For each program, we regressed per capita spending by state
on state average participation, plus four of the quintile-specific participation rates. We were
unable to reject the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates on the quintile-specific
participation rates were jointly zero.12 The coefficients on the state average participation rates
were highly significant, as one would expect.  Thus we find no evidence that the subsidy rate
varies significantly by quintile. This helps justify the standard constant-subsidy assumption of
BIA when interpreting our results for these public programs.
5.  Results
We begin with primary school enrollments for children aged 5-9 years. Table 1 gives the
average enrollment rates from the 1993-94 NSS data.'3 Enrollment rates rise with household
expenditure per capita nationally, and in all states; Table Al  in the Appendix gives the results by
state.  And they tend to be higher for boys than girls.  However, there are marked differences
between states.  In Kerala there is less difference between the quintiles and between boys and
12  The probability  values  for the F-tests  were, respectively,  0.57, 0.1  1, and 0.23 for Primary  Schooling,  Public
Works and IRDP.
13  Our calculated enrollment rates from the National Sample Survey are appreciably lower than those obtained
from schools themselves on which official enrollment rates are based. The official primary enrollment rate for
India was over 100% in 1993. There are differences in definilion; for example, we have confined attention to
the age group 5-9, and so missed late starters. However, though there are reasons to believe that biases in
official sources lead to overestimation of enrollments in India (Kingdon, 1996).
14girls (indeed, enrollment rates are slightly higher for girls from the poorest quintile in Kerala)
than found in (say) Bihar or Punjab (Table Al).
It can be seen that the average enrollment rates tend to be lowest for the poorest quintile,
and to increase as consumption per person increases. The average odds of enrollment suggest
that subsidies to primary schooling will would mildly favor the non-poor.  Notice, however, that
we cannot split public from private schooling in the data, and that public school enrollments may
well be lower for the well off.  Figures 3 and 4 plot the enrollment rates, for the poorest and
richest quintiles respectively, by region against the state averages.  It can be seen that while the
average enrollment rate is higher for the richer quintile, the relationship between the region-
specific enrollment rates and the state average rate is steeper for the poorest quintile.  Thus the
MOP is higher for the poor, even though the average participation rate is lower.
Table 2 gives the estimated marginal odds of being enrolled, obtained by regressing the
participation rates of each quintile across NSS regions on the state average participation rate over
all programs. 1 4 Following the discussions above, the numbers in Table 2 can be interpreted as
the gain in subsidy incidence per capita for each quintile from a one Rupee increase in aggregate
spending on each program.  For example, an extra 100 Rupees per capita spent on primary
schools will increase the public expenditure per capita going to the poorest quintile by 110
Rupees.
The MOP estimates suggest that an expansion of primary schooling would be decidedly
pro-poor at the margin. (As in standard BIA, future earnings gains from better education are not
14  As discussed above, these are Instrumental Variables Estimates using the leave-out mean as the instrument for
the state average participation rate. The lines of best fit in Figures 3 and 4 are Ordinary Least Squares.
15factored into this calculation.) The implication for the incidence of subsidies to primary
education is clear (given our inability to reject the constant unit subsidy assumption).  While the
average odds of participation in Table 1 suggest that the share of the total subsidy going to the
poorest quintile is only 14% (0.71 times one fifth), the marginal odds in Table 2 imply that the
poorest quintile would obtain about 22% of an increase in the total subsidy going to primary
education.
There is also a gender difference between the average and marginal odds of participation
by the poor.  The average odds of poor kids being in school are higher for boys (0.75 versus 0.66
for girls; see Table 1). However, the marginal odds are almost identical (1.09 versus 1.08).
These results are clearly-not what one would expect with homogeneous participation.
Marginal gains from expanding primary schooling in rural India are much better distributed than
average gains.
Turning now to the anti-poverty programs, Table 3 gives the average participation rates
and average odds of participation by quintile for each of the anti-poverty programs. For both
public works programs and IRDP, participation rates fall as expenditure per person increases.
However, the rate of decline is not large; the odds of the poorest quintile participating in public
works programs is 1.23, versus 0.83 for the richest quintile; the rate of decline is even lower for
IRDP.  Participation rates amongst the richest 20% in terms of consumption per person are high
even for public works programs. For PDS, the participation rate is actually lowest for the poorest
quintile, with highest participation amongst the middle expenditure quintile.
These are national aggregates.  The Appendix (Table A2) gives a breakdown of the
participation rates by state.  We find large differences between states. In Orissa, the proportion
16of households in the poorest quintile participating in public works programs is over four times
higher than for the richest quintile; the odds of the poorest 20% participating is 1.6, well above
the national mean (Table 3). For Maharashtra, the odds of the poorest quintile participating in
public works programs is also well above the national average.  At the other extreme, one finds
states such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu where the poorest quintile have
a below average participation rate.
Table 4 gives the estimated marginal odds of participation. (The regional plots for all
programs and the poorest and richest quintiles, analogous to Figures 3 and 4 for schooling, are
available from the authors.) The MOP for the poorest quintile is highest for public works
programs, while IRDP dominates for the three middle quintiles; the PDS has the highest MOP
for the richest quintile. The MOP coefficients broadly confirm the conclusion from the average
odds of participation (Table 3) that the public works programs perform best at reaching the
poorest, while IRDP is more effective in reaching the middle quintiles, including those living at
India's poverty line (at roughly the 40th percentile).
The difference between the MOP numbers for any two programs gives the estimated gain
from switching one Rupee between the two programs.  For example, switching 100 Rupees per
capita from PDS to public works programs would increase public spending per capita on the
poorest quintile by 10 Rupees (1 16-106=10, using the basic model).
For both the public works programs and IRDP, it is notable that the marginal odds of
participation tend to fall more steeply as one moves from the poorest to the richest quintiles than
do the average odds (Table 3). Thus the average odds underestimate how "pro-poor" an increase
in average spending on each of these programs will be. This is particularly strong for IRDP, for
17which the average odds of participation are only slightly higher for the poorest quintile than the
richest (1.03 versus 0.89), while there is a large difference in the MOP (1.  11 versus 0.39).  When
compared to the average odds of participation (as normally used in benefit incidence studies), the
share of the total IRDP spending imputed to the poorest 40% of the population is 1 1% higher,
while that imputed to the richest 20% is 56% lower. For PDS, however, there is less difference
between the average and marginal odds, so the former are a better guide to PDS incidence than
for the other two programs.
As with primary school enrollments, these results are inconsistent with the homogeneity
assumptions routinely made in benefit incidence analysis.  We do not see the same reversal
between average and marginal odds as we did in Tables 1 and 2; for the anti-poverty programs,
both average and marginal odds of participation tend to be higher for the poor.  However,  as
with schooling, marginal gains from these programs tend to be better distributed than average
gains, as indicated by the fact that the marginal odds tend to be relatively lower for the non-poor
than the average odds.
Before concluding, it is worth reviewing some of the assumptions which underpin our
efforts to estimate the marginal incidence of spending on these programs.  As described in
section 3, we estimated the MOP by regressing quintile-specific participation rates across regions
on the average participation rates (all quintiles, all regions) for each program. No other
explanatory variables (such as state-level poverty rates) were included in this specification.  To
the extent that such variables matter to quintile-specific participation via their influence on state
average participation rates, they are not of concern, since it is the effect of expansion in the
overall size of the program which we are interested in evaluating.  There is, however, one way in
18which our simple specification may be unsatisfactory.  Section 2 outlined how political economy
factors could influence program incidence.  Yet, by not including political economy variables as
separate explanatory variables in our regression, we implicitly assume that those elements of  the
political economy configuration which determine the timing of program capture are identical
across states.
While we were unable to control for regional fixed-effects in our estimations since we do
not have time series data, we were able to probe the above assumption to some extent.  First, we
re-ran each  model by regressing quintile and region-specific participation rates on a full set of
state dummy variables, for each program.  We then compared the R2's from these regressions to
those that had obtained from our regressions on state participation rates. We found that in most
cases the R2's  from the  state-level participation rate specifications were above 70% of those
from the state fixed-effect regression, indicating that our state average participation rate variable
was able to capture nearly as much of the variation in the dependent variable as a specification
which allowed each state to exercise a separate impact.' 5
Second, we examined the residuals from our regression utilizing  state average
participation rates, to see whether for any given state and quintile, the average of the residuals
across regions was significantly higher or lower than that observed for other states.  For example,
are the participation rates amongst the bottom quintile in Kerala or West Bengal (both of which
have had long periods of left-wing governments) unusually high given the state average
participation rate, reflecting a difference in the political-economy, favoring the poor?  We found
In the case of primary schooling of boys, the R2's  from our specification declined from about 75% of the R2
from the state fixed-effect specification for the lowest two quintiles to an average of about 45% for the top two
quintiles.  In the case of Public Works programs, the ratio of R2's averaged around 50% for the three lowest
quintiles, and rising to 70% for the 4th, and then declining to 31% for the top quintile.
19no regular patterns in these average state-level residuals. In very few cases  (looking at the
average residuals per state, for each of the quintile-specific and program-specific regressions) did
the average residual per state exceed in absolute value the standard error of the regression as a
whole.  And in the few cases where this did occur, there was no discernible pattern in which a
given state appeared to be consistently more effective in reaching a particular quintile across
programs.  The only pattern which does emerge is that for primary school enrollment in both
Haryana and Punjab (of boys, girls, and jointly), the average  residuals for the bottom quintile
were uniformly negative and larger than one standard error.  On dropping these two states (on the
presumption that the political economy is appreciably different), our estimate of the marginal
incidence of additional spending on education in the poorest quintile were slightly higher than in
16 Table 2; for boys the MOP rose to 1.  16, for girls it was 1.  12, and the average was 1.13.  So the
direction of changes adds support to our main result on the comparisons of the average and
marginal odds of participation.
6.  Conclusions
"Benefit incidence" analyses are often used to infer the distributional impact of changes
in public outlays on a social program, based on average participation rates conditional on income
or some other welfare metric.  The inferences drawn for public spending reform could be wrong
if program participation is nonhomogeneous, such that the composition of participants varies
with the size of the program.
16  For the second poorest quintile the MOP was 0.98 for boys, 0.99 for girls, and  1.01  overall,
20Motivated by a simple model of the political-economy of program capture, we have used
Indian data to test the homogeneity assumption of benefit incidence methodology.  We have
offered a relatively simple method of estimating the marginal odds of program participation.  The
method uses inter-regional differences in program scale to infer how the composition of
participation varies with program expansion or contraction. The method can be implemented
with the same basic data used by conventional benefit-incidence analysis.
We find that the average participation rates are not a reliable guide to the distributional
impacts of small changes in aggregate public outlays or reallocations between programs.  Our
estimates of the marginal odds of participation based on the inter-regional variation broadly
confirm the qualitative conclusion from the average participation numbers for the three poverty
programs we have studied here.  However, we find that the average odds of participation - as
are typically used in benefit incidence calculations - greatly understate how pro-poor extra
spending on either public works programs or the means-tested credit scheme is likely to be, and
(conversely) conventional methods underestimate the loss to the poor from program cuts. The
average odds also underestimate how pro-poor a switch from (say) the food distribution system
to public works programs will be in India.
In the case of primary schooling, the average odds of participation also give the wrong
qualitative result on whether expansion is pro-poor. While the average odds of enrollment rise
with expenditure per person, the marginal odds fall sharply indicating that expansion is decidedly
pro-poor.  Indeed, the marginal odds suggest that current subsidies to primary education are
about as pro-poor as the best of the programs directed (explicitly) at fighting poverty.
21For both primary schooling and the poverty programs (except the food rationing scheme),
our results are more consistent with the "early capture" model described by Figure 1 than by the
"late capture" model of Figure 2.  The geographic pattern of participation by quintile suggests
that the non-poor tend to be the first to gain when a program is introduced, but that high marginal
gains to the poor emerge later.
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24Table 1: Average primary school enrollment in rural India
Quintile  Boys  Girls  Total
Enrollmenit  Average  Enrollment  Average  Enrollment  Average
rate  odds  of  rate  odds of  rate  odds  of
(%)  enrollment  (%)  enrollment  (%)  enrollment
(mean=1.0)  (mean=1.0)  (mean=l.0)
Poorest  42.6  0.75  31.6  0.66  37.2  0.71
2nd  53.4  0.93  43.1  0.91  48.6  0.90
3rd  60.5  1.07  50.3  1.06  55.8  1.08
4th  66.1  1.16  58.6  1.26  62.6  1.21
5th  69.9  1.23  65.2  1.38  67.7  1.31
Note: The table gives the average primary school enrollment rates as a percentage of children aged 5-9, and
the odds of enrollment, defined as the ratio of the quintile-specific enrollment rate to the mean rate.
Calculations based on the  1993-94 National Sample Survey.
25Table 2: Marginal  odds of primary  school enrollment
Quintile  Boys  Girls  Total
Poorest  1.09  1.08  1.10
(6.90)  (9.65)  (8.99)
2nd  0.91  0.91  0.97
(6.05)  (6.99)  (7.92)
3rd  0.92  0.84  0.87
(5.85)  (6.54)  (7.65)
4th  0.66  0.66  0.67
(4.10)  (4.28)  (4.77)
5th  0.53  0.70  0.67
(4.08)  (5.53)  (5.69)
Notes: The table gives the instrumental  variables  estimate  of the regression  coefficient  of the quintile-specific
primary  school  enrollment  rates  across  regions  on the average  rate by state for that program,  based  on the 1993-94
National  Sample  Survey. The leave-out  mean  state  enrollment  rate is the instrument  for the actual  mean.  The
numbers  in parentheses  are t-ratios.
26Table 3: Average participation rates for India's main anti-poverty programs in rural areas
Quintile of  Public Works Programs  Integrated Rural  Public Distribution
expenditure  Development Program  System
per capita
Participa-  Average  Participa-  Average  Participa-  Average
tion rate  odds of  tion rate  odds of  tion rate  odds of
(%)  participation  (%)  participation  (%)  participation
(mean=  .0)  (mean=1 .0)  (mean=1 .0)
Poorest  5.0  1.23  6.5  1.03  69.5  0.92
2nd  4.6  1.13  7.1  1.13  76.7  1.01
3rd  4.2  1.04  6.4  1.03  77.9  1.03
4th  3.5  0.86  6.0  0.96  78.1  1.00
5th  3.4  0.83  5.6  0.89  76.1  1.00
Note: The table gives the average  participation  rates  and the odds  of participation,  defined  as the ratio of the
quintile-specific  participation  rate to the mean  participation  rate for each program.  Calculations  based on the 1993-
94 National  Sample  Survey.
27Table 4: Marginal odds of participation for India's anti-poverty programs
Quintile  Public Works  Integrated Rural  Public Distribution
Programs  Development Program  System
Poorest  1.16  1.11  1.06
(3.27)  (15.49)  (8.14)
2nd  0.93  1.28  0.99
(3.64)  (17.73)  (7.26)
3rd  0.80  1.21  0.91
(2.98)  (23.52)  (6.88)
4th  0.92  0.96  0.86
(4.32)  (19.09)  (7.16)
5th  0.55  0.39  0.81
(3.29)  (8.06)  (6.27)
Notes: The table gives  the instrumental  variables  estimate  of the regression  coefficient  of the quintile-specific
program  participation  rates  across  regions  on the average  participation  rate by state for that program,  based  on the
1993-94  National  Sample  Survey. The leave-out  mean  state  participation  rate is the instrument  for the actual mean.
The numbers  in parentheses  are t-ratios.
28Appendix: Participation Rates by State, Rural India, 1993-94
Table Al: Primary School Enrollment for Children Aged 5-9
State  Quintile  Boys  Girls  All
ANDHRA PRADESH  bottom  38.4  30.6  34.3
2nd  46.6  40.7  43.3
3rd  55.1  39.4  47.2
4tlh  64.0  48.9  56.2
top  61.4  61.1  61.3
TOTAL  56.2  46.9  51.4
ASSAM  bottom  52.0  50.1  51.2
2nd  64.1  59.7  62.0
3rd  65.2  66.6  65.9
4th  76.4  72.4  74.5
top  83.4  78.1  81.1
TOTAL  63.7  61.4  62.7
BIHAR  bottom  36.6  19.8  28.7
2nd  47.0  36.8  42.6
3rd  58.5  45.3  53.3
4tlh  59.7  54.4  57.6
top  75.6  61.3  68.6
TOTAL  47.5  33.4  41.2
GOA  bottom  n.a  n.a  n.a.
2nd  n.a  n.a  n.a
3rd  67.9  67.6  67.7
4th  66.6  71.2  69.3
top  80.3  88.6  85.4
TOTAL  76.5  74.2  75.1
GUJARAT  bottom  51.1  43.2  46.9
2nd  60.0  43.0  52.1
3rd  67.2  57.8  62.5
4tlh  67.4  66.9  67.2
top  64.6  67.6  65.8
TOTAL  63.6  56.7  60.4
HARYANA  bottom  34.7  21.8  28.1
2nd  46.0  47.7  46.9
3rd  60.5  35.9  49.0
4th  66.3  59.8  62.7
top  77.9  63.8  71.6
TOTAL  59.3  47.3  53.3
29State  Quintile  Boys  Girls  All
HIMACHAL
PRADESH  bottom  70.1  55.4  60.9
2nd  76.0  73.8  74.8
3rd  82.5  80.9  81.6
4th  88.8  86.8  87.9
top  90.4  89.3  89.9
TOTAL  82.5  76.7  79.5
KARNATAKA  bottom  43.8  28.0  36.3
2nd  64.6  57.7  61.0
3rd  61.2  63.0  62.1
4th  74.2  62.6  68.3
top  77.4  71.6  74.7
TOTAL  63.7  55.9  59.9
KERALA  bottom  75.4  79.0  77.0
2nd  88.6  83.8  86.4
3rd  88.3  85.9  87.2
4th  84.6  78.2  81.8
top  79.3  90.0  85.0
TOTAL  83.5  84.1  83.8
MADHYA
PRADESH  bottom  35.8  28.2  31.9
2nd  48.9  33.9  41.9
3rd  51.0  43.1  47.3
4th  63.1  62.2  62.7
top  64.7  55.4  60.6
TOTAL  50.1  41.1  45.8
MAHARASHTRA  bottom  55.1  46.5  50.5
2nd  64.1  59.3  61.8
3rd  71.5  66.0  68.9
4th  73.6  72.3  73.0
top  80.6  69.8  75.6
TOTAL  66.8  59.3  63.2
ORISSA  bottom  35.2  27.3  31.3
2nd  50.9  39.5  45.4
3rd  54.5  51.7  53.2
4th  57.2  46.2  51.4
top  65.9  57.1  61.6
TOTAL  47.5  39.2  43.4
30State  Quintile  Boys  Girls  All
PUNJAB  bottom  37.7  22.7  29.2
2nd  63.5  51.3  58.0
3rd  76.2  57.9  67.2
4th  81.1  76.3  79.2
top  80.1  87.0  83.0
TOTAL  74.9  66.6  71.2
RAJASTHAN  bottom  40.3  14.4  27.3
2nd  49.3  20.6  34.9
3rd  49.5  26.4  39.1
4thi  59.7  29.0  45.8
top  64.1  51.4  58.3
TOTAL  53.5  28.4  41.7
TAMIL NADU  bottom  66.7  66.5  66.6
2nd  75.0  69.0  72.3
3rd  77.2  71.3  74.2
4thi  81.8  82.1  82.0
top  76.7  91.5  83.9
TOTAL  75.0  74.2  74.6
UTTAR PRADESH  bottom  42.4  24.5  34.3
2nd  47.4  32.1  40.9
3rd  57.9  42.7  51.0
4tlh  55.9  46.8  52.0
top  63.7  54.0  59.1
TOTAL  51.3  37.1  45.0
WEST BENGAL  bottom  36.6  36.4  36.5
2nd  48.7  44.8  46.9
3rd  59.8  50.4  55.4
4th  69.5  72.9  71.1
top  80.0  76.1  77.9
TOTAL  53.3  49.9  51.7
DADRA & NAGAR  bottom  62.3  44.9  55.5
2nd  65.8  66.7  66.2
3rd  100.0  40.1  65.3
4th  97.4  29.3  51.0
top  83.5  100.0  86.0
TOTAL  70.2  50.9  62.3
DELHI  bottom  ii.a.  n.a.  n.a.
2nd  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
3rd  41.7  36.8  38.7
4thl  100.0  100.0  100.0
top  66.5  68.7  62.7
TOTAL  70.0  57.6  65.0
NATIONAL  TOTAL  56.6  47.0  52.1
31Table  A2: Participation  Rates by State  for Three Anti-Poverty  Programs
State  Quintile  % participating in  % participating  % with access to the
Public Works  in the  Public Distribution
Programs  IRDP Program  System
ANDHRA PRADESH  poorest  2.3  2.5  79.0
2nd  2.7  2.9  87.0
3rd  4.1  4.3  84.5
4tlh  3.3  4.4  82.5
5th  3.2  4.0  81.8
TOTAL  3.3  4.0  82.8
ASSAM  poorest  3.6  4.3  84.3
2nd  3.6  2.8  86.4
3rd  4.9  2.2  87.6
4th  2.0  1.9  86.5
5th  1.7  2.9  84.7
TOTAL  3.4  2.7  86.2
BIHAR  poorest  5.4  5.8  68.7
2nd  5.8  6.0  77.6
3rd  4.4  5.0  76.2
4th  2.8  4.6  78.1
5th  3.9  2.9  75.2
TOTAL  4.8  5.2  74.4
GOA  poorest  0.0  0.0  65.1
2nd  0.0  0.0  100.0
3rd  0.0  0.0  100.0
4tlh  4.6  0.0  100.0
5th  2.3  2.7  92.1
TOTAL  2.3  1.8  93.8
GUJARAT  poorest  2.6  11.3  84.2
2nd  4.6  11.6  90.2
3rd  3.9  8.6  88.5
4tlh  2.3  9.9  86.3
5th  2.4  7.4  83.8
TOTAL  3.0  9.1  86.3
HARYANA  poorest  2.5  7.3  86.9
2nd  5.1  6.8  93.2
3rd  2.0  7.3  91.2
4th  2.1  9.5  90.0
5th  2.1  6.0  86.3
TOTAL  2.6  7.2  89.0
32State  Quintile  % participating in  % participating  % with access to the
Public Works  in the  Public Distribution
Programs  IRDP Program  System
HIMACHAL  PRADESH  poorest  8.4  5.4  88.0
2nd  8.2  8.5  89.8
3rd  9.0  5.6  91.3
4tlh  5.9  4.9  91.1
5th  3.0  4.3  82.8
TOTAL  6.2  5.5  88.0
KARNATAKA  poorest  2.9  2.8  75.5
2nd  4.0  6.8  78.4
3rd  2.5  5.5  78.9
4th  2.4  5.1  76.5
5th  3.0  5.8  78.1
TOTAL  2.9  5.4  77.6
KERALA  poorest  1.5  3.4  93.4
2nd  2.9  5.6  96.3
3rd  3.5  5.2  94.3
4tll  4.2  4.2  94.5
5th  3.7  4.1  89.4
TOTAL  3.5  4.4  92.8
MADHYA PRADESH  poorest  5.8  9.7  60.7
2nd  5.7  11.5  66.3
3rd  4.9  6.8  67.8
4tfl  5.2  8.3  70.6
5th  5.7  9.6  72.1
TOTAL  5.5  9.2  67.5
MAHARASHTRA  poorest  9.7  7.7  58.8
2nd  8.0  9.6  68.1
3rd  8.4  8.4  73.3
4th  6.5  8.6  77.3
5th  4.1  5.1  73.3
TOTAL  7.1  7.7  70.5
ORISSA  poorest  9.4  6.2  72.6
2nd  5.7  5.6  77.9
3rd  5.9  5.3  83.6
4th  3.3  7.2  87.3
5tlh  2.2  6.3  81.7
TOTAL  5.9  6.1  79.8
33State  Quintile  % participating in  % participating  °/, with access to the
Public Works  -in the  Public Distribution
Program  lRDP Program  System
PUNJAB  poorest  0.0  4.7  67.3
2nd  3.9  0.5  66.9
3rd  2.3  6.1  65.7
4th  2.3  2.2  71.4
5th  1.9  4.4  72.8
TOTAL  2.1  3.8  70.5
RAJASTHAN  poorest  4.2  5.7  62.9
2nd  6.5  7.1  57.9
3rd  4.8  5.3  64.0
4th  4.3  4.0  57.6
5th  2.6  5.5  53.6
TOTAL  4.2  5.4  58.1
TAMIL NADU  poorest  2.0  7.5  87.5
2nd  1.9  5.1  86.2
3rd  3.0  6.2  89.7
4th  2.4  5.3  87.2
5th  4.3  5.5  83.6
TOTAL  2.9  5.8  86.6
UTTAR PRADESH  poorest  4.0  6.4  55.9
2nd  4.1  7.0  63.2
3rd  4.2  8.1  62.6
4tlh  3.6  6.7  63.5
5th  2.9  6.7  63.7
TOTAL  3.8  7.0  61.6
WEST BENGAL  poorest  3.6  6.2  90.2
2nd  2.4  8.3  91.9
3rd  1.8  8.2  90.7
4th  2.4  5.8  90.0
5th  3.0  5.8  88.6
TOTAL  2.6  7.0  90.4
DADRA & NAGAR  poorest  3.4  67.0  69.8
2nd  1.7  77.8  73.1
3rd  5.9  75.0  68.6
4tlh  1.0  58.0  71.9
5th  0.0  25.4  72.1
TOTAL  2.3  60.7  71.3
DELHI  poorest  - - -
2nd  0.0  0.0  100.0
3rd  0.0  0.0  48.3
4th  3.3  0.0  100.0
5th  1.7  0.0  53.0
TOTAL  1.6  0.0  55.5
NATIONAL  TOTAL  4.1  6.3  75.8
34Figure  1: Early  Capture
Participation is no higher for the poor at point A, but they capture
the bulk of the gains from program expansion
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35Figure  2: Late Capture
Participation  is higher  for the poor at point  B, but expansion  favors  the non-poor
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36Figure 3
Regional and State  Particiwption Rates
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